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Stable matching in a community consisting of N men and N women is a classical combinatorial problem that
has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal
paper by Gale and Shapley.
When the input preference profile is generated from a distribution, we study the output distribution of two
stablematching procedures:women-proposing-deferred-acceptance andmen-proposing-deferred-acceptance.
We show that the two procedures are ex-ante equivalent: that is, under certain conditions on the input distri-
bution, their output distributions are identical.
In terms of technical contributions, we generalize (to the non-uniform case) an integral formula, due to
Knuth and Pittel, which gives the probability that a fixed matching is stable. Using an inclusion-exclusion
principle on the set of rotations, we give a new formula which gives the probability that a fixed matching is
the women/men-optimal stable matching. We show that those two probabilities are equal with an integration
by substitution.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Stable matching is a classical combinatorial problem, whereN women andN men, all heterosexual
and monogamous, have ordinal preferences over the persons of the opposite sex. The objective is
to find a matching without any blocking pair: a woman and a man who are not married to each
other but prefer each other to their actual mates.
In their seminal paper, Gale and Shapley [8] proved that there always exists a stable match-
ing, and gave a deferred acceptance procedure to find it: one side proposes, while the other side
disposes. However, the men proposing deferred acceptance (MPDA) and women proposing deferred
acceptance (WPDA) might not find the same stable matching. Moreover, Gale and Shapley showed
that MPDA finds a stable matching which is optimal for the men and pessimal for the women
(men have their best possible stable wife and women have their worst possible stable husband).
By symmetry, WPDA finds a stable matching which is optimal for the women and pessimal for
the men. Thus, there is a unique stable matching if and only if MPDA andWPDA output the same
matching.
More recently, the research community in economics and computation has studied the extend
to which the output of MPDA and WPDA differ in real life instances1 , using either empirical data
or stochastic models [4, 9, 11, 12, 16], showing that most of the time a stable matching is essentially
unique (phenomenon often referred as “core-convergence”).
Following this direction of enquiry, we consider a model where the input preference profile is
generated from a distribution. We show that under certain types of input distribution, the output
distributions of MPDA and WPDA are identical. This result is unusual for several reasons:
• Most of the literature focuses on “largemarkets” where the core converges when the number
of agents grow to infinity. Our result is stronger: output distributions are identical, and this
equality holds no matter what the size of the market is.
• But in return, we only proved a weaker property of “ex-ante core-convergence”; whereas
most papers study ex-post the difference between outputs of MPDA and WPDA.
Our contribution in this paper is threefold: we discovered numerically an intriguing mathemati-
cal property (ex-ante equivalence of WPDA andMPDA) which holds in randommatching markets
with a vanilla model of preference distributions (see Section 2 and Theorem 1); we identified a
larger class of preference distributions for which this property remains valid (see Section 4 and
Theorem 2); and we formally proved this property (see Section 5). Previous results that are used
in our analysis are summarized in Section 3.
2 MOTIVATING SPECIAL CASE
Consider a random two-sided matching market, where a (given) procedure computes a stable
matching. Every agent of the market is interested by the distribution of outcomes. But comput-
ing which outcome an agent can expect is a difficult question, that has only been answered in
special cases (for example, see [17] for a model with random vertical preferences). The starting
point of this work was to understand the output distributions of MPDA and WPDA, in a very sim-
ple matching market with M men andW women having heterogeneous preferences (agents have
idiosyncratic preferences).
Definition 1 (Incomplete uniform preference distribution). Consider any fixed bipartite graph
G = (M ∪W, E) withM = {m1, . . . ,mM } the set of men,W = {w1, . . . ,wW } the set of women,
and E ⊆ M×W the set of edges. Each agent ranks his/her neighbours (non-edges are not accept-
able), uniformly and independently at random. We call such input model an incomplete uniform
preference distribution.
1Deferred acceptance procedures have been successfully implemented in many matching markets; see [1, 2, 6, 24].
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m3 ≻w2 m2 ≻w2 m1
m2 ≻w3 m3
w2 ≻m1 w1
w2 ≻m2 w3
w3 ≻m3 w2
Fig. 1. Example of incomplete uniform preference distribution. The probability of sampling this particular
preference profile is 1/(2! · 2! · 2! · 1! · 3! · 2!) = 1/96. There are two stable matchings, MPDA outputs
{(m1,w1), (m2,w2), (m3,w3)} and WPDA outputs {(m1,w1), (m2,w3), (m3,w2)}.
Figure 1 illustrates Definition 1, on a bipartite graph with 3 women and 3 men. The output distri-
butions of procedures MPDA andWPDA can (painfully) be computed by hand, and they happen to
be identical. They are given in Figure 2. In particular P[MPDA outputs µ1] = P[WPDA outputs µ1]
is already a non-trivial result, as Figure 1 describes an instancewhereMPDAoutputs µ1 andWPDA
outputs µ2.
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µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4
Probability 19/48 19/48 5/48 5/48
Fig. 2. Output distribution, common to the procedures MPDA and WPDA, using the input model of Figure
1.
For every bipartite graph withM ,W ≤ 4, we used computer simulations to compute the output
distribution of MPDA andWPDA. Surprisingly the two output distributions were always identical,
which led us to conjecture Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. In a random matching market where the preference profile is sampled from an incom-
plete uniform preference distribution, the output distributions of MPDA and WPDA are identical.
Proof sketch. In Section 5 we prove Theorem 2. In Subsection 4.2 we prove that Theorem 2
implies Theorem 1. Nonetheless, let us give the ideas of the proof on the example of Figures 1
and 2.
To compute the probability that WPDA outputs µ1, we first compute the probability that µ1 is
stable. Then we subtract the probability that µ1 is stable but not women-optimal, because µ2 is
stable and improves the outcome of women. It turns out that the probability that µ2 improves the
outcome of women is equal to the probability that µ2 improves the outcome of men, hence MPDA
and WPDA have the same probability of outputting µ1.
In more complicated instances, where there are several ways to improve the outcome of women,
we use an inclusion-exclusion principle on the set of rotations (defined in Subsection 3.2). 
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3 PREVIOUS RESULTS
In this section, we summarize previous results that are used in our analysis, and define the nota-
tions that will be used in the rest of the paper. First, we argue that without loss of generality we
can consider matching markets with an equal number of men and women, and where every couple
is acceptable (this will be discussed further in Subsection 4.2). Then, we review classical results
on the structure of the set of stable matchings. Finally, we recall existing formulas which give the
probability of stability of a fixed matching.
3.1 Stable Matchings
Stable matchings were introduced in 1962 by Gale and Shapley [8]. Let us start with formal defi-
nitions and classical notations. Let N be an integer, M = {m1, . . . ,mN } be a set of men, and let
letW = {w1, . . . ,wN } be a set of women. Each manm has a total ordering (≻m) over the women,
and each woman w has a total ordering (≻w ) over the men. We view a matching as a function
µ : M∪W →M∪W, which is an involution (µ2 = Id), where each man is paired with a woman
(µ(M) ⊆ W), and each woman is paired with a man (µ(W) ⊆ M). A matching is stable if there
are no blocking pairs (m,w), wherem prefersw to his wife andw prefersm to her husband.
Matching µ is stable ⇔ ∀m ∈ M,∀w ∈ W, (µ(m) m w) or (µ(w) w m)
In the classical definition of stable matchings, the preference lists are complete. However, inmost
applications, it is not practical to ask every agent to report a full preference list. In a generalization
of stable matchings, people can declare some members of the opposite sex to be unacceptable. In
this setting, stable matchingsmay not be perfect matchings, and a pair (m,w) can block a matching
only if bothm and w declare each other to be acceptable. A further generalization allows the set
of men and the set of women to be of different size.
In Section 2, we described a model of stable matchings with unacceptable partners. Without
loss of generality, it is enough to study balanced matching markets with complete preference list.
Firstly, dealing with unbalanced matching markets is easy: it is always possible to add “virtual”
persons that are unacceptable to everyone from the opposite sex. Secondly, in matching markets
with unacceptable partners, the set of people that are matched is the same in every stable match-
ing. Therefore, running MPDA (resp. WPDA) with unacceptable partners is equivalent with the
following procedure: first we symmetrize unacceptability (such that w is acceptable to m if and
only if m is acceptable to w), second we append unacceptable partners at the end of preference
lists (in any arbitrary order), third we run MPDA (resp. WPDA) on this new instance, fourth we
remove couples that were not acceptable.
3.2 Laice of stable matchings
Given in input the preference profile (containing all the preference lists), the procedure MPDA
outputs a stable matching µM which is optimal for the men and pessimal for the women. Symmet-
rically, WPDA outputs a stable matching µW which is optimal for the women and pessimal for the
men.
∀µ stable matching, ∀m ∈ M, µM (m) m µ(m) m µW(m)
∀w ∈ W, µW(w) w µ(w) w µM (w)
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The structure of the set of stable matchings was studied by Knuth and Conway [14, 15]: with the
partial orders M and W , the set of stable matching is a distributive lattice.
∀µ1, µ2 stable matchings, µ1 M µ2 ⇔ ∀m ∈ M, µ1(m) m µ2(m)
µ1 W µ2 ⇔ ∀w ∈ W, µ1(w) w µ2(w)
µ1 W µ2 ⇔ µ2 M µ1
The concept of rotation was later introduced by Irving, Leather and Gusfield (see [10] for a
nice survey). We view a rotation as a simple directed cycle r in the complete bipartite graph over
M∪W. When a person x ∈ M∪W belongs to the cycle, we write x ∈ r , denote r (x) a successor
and r−1(x) a predecessor. In a stable matching µ1, rotation r is exposed and women-improving if
for all man m, r (m) = µ1(m) and r
−1(m) is m’s favourite woman among women w to whom he
prefers his wife (µ1(m) ≻m w), and who prefer m to their husband (m ≻w µ1(w)). Eliminating
rotation r in matching µ1 creates a new stable matching µ2; we have µ2 W µ1.
∀m ∈ M , µ2(m) =
{
r−1(m) ifm ∈ r
µ1(m) ifm < r
∀w ∈ W, µ2(w) =
{
r (w) if w ∈ r
µ1(w) if w < r
Symmetrically, rotation r is exposed and men-improving in stable matching µ2. Eliminating r in
µ2 creates stable matching µ1; we have µ1 M µ2.
m1
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w2 ≻m2 w3 ≻m2 w1
w3 ≻m3 w2 ≻m3 w1
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w3
m1
m2
m3
w1
w2
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m1 ≻w1 m2 ≻w1 m3
m3 ≻w2 m2 ≻w2 m1
m2 ≻w3 m3 ≻w3 m1
Matching µ1 Rotation r Matching µ2
Fig. 3. Example of rotation r , women-improving from µ1 to µ2, men-improving from µ2 to µ1.
If several rotations are exposed and women-improving in the same stable matching, those ro-
tations are disjoint. To describe several disjoint rotations exposed in the same matching, we will
use the concept of stable permutations. Stable permutations (also called stable partitions) have
been defined for the more general problem of stable roommates [26]. A permutation is a bijection
σ : M ∪W → M ∪W, where the successor of a man is a woman (σ (M) ⊆ W), and where
the successor of a woman is a man (σ (W) ⊆ M). A permutation σ is stable if each person x
prefers their successor to their predecessor (σ (x) x σ
−1(x)), and if there are no blocking pairs
(m,w), wherem prefers w to his predecessor (w ≻m σ
−1(m)) and w prefersm to her predecessor
(m ≻w σ
−1(w)).
To conclude this subsection on the structure of stable matchings, we summarize properties on
matchings, rotations, and permutations. Those properties will be useful in Section 5.
• A matching µ is stable (as a matching) if and only if it is stable (as a permutation).
• Let σ be a permutation. Every cycle of length > 2 of σ is a rotation. Let µ1 be the only match-
ing such that µ1 |M = σ |M . Let µ2 be the only matching such that µ2 |W = σ |W . Permutation
σ is stable if and only if matchings µ1 and µ2 are both stable, and every rotation induced by
σ is exposed and women improving (resp. men improving) in µ1 (resp. µ2).
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3.3 Probability of Stability
Random matching markets with N men and N women having uniformly random preference lists
were studied in [14, 15, 20, 21]. Knuth gave an integral formula for the probability pN that a fixed
matching is stable; with the objective of computing the asymptotic average number of stablematch-
ings (in the uniform case, allN ! matchings have the same probability of being stable). In 1989, Pittel
gave an alternate proof of this integral formula, and showed that N ! · pN ∼ e
−1N lnN .
Let us retranscribe Pittel’s proof of the integral formula. Let µ be any matching. Let X and Y be
two random matrices, uniformly sampled from [0, 1]M×W. Manm prefers woman w1 to woman
w2 if Xm,w1 < Xm,w2 . Correspondingly, womanw prefers manm1 to manm2 if Ym1,w < Ym2,w .
Thus, a pair (m,w) is blocking matching µ if and only if Xm,w < Xm,µ (m) and Ym,w < Yµ (w ),m .
We condition on the values of x = [Xm,µ (m)]m∈M and y = [Yµ (w ),w]w ∈W , and write the probability
that a pair blocks µ:
∀(m,w) such that µ(m) , w and µ(w) , w, P[(m,w) blocks µ | x, y] = xm · yw
Still conditioning on x and y, blocking events are independent, hence the formula:
P[µ is stable] =
∫
· · ·
∫
︸    ︷︷    ︸
2N
dx · dy ·
∏
m,w
µ (m),w
µ (w ),m
(1 − xmyw )
In subsequent works [22, 23], Pittel extended the above formula to compute the probability that
a fixed permutation is stable. We recall that a permutation σ is stable if the following is true:
• Every person x prefers their successor to their predecessors (σ (x) x σ
−1(x))
• For each pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W, we have (σ−1(m) m w) or (σ
−1(w) w m)
We condition on the values of x = [Xm,σ −1(m)]m∈M and y = [Yσ −1(w ),w]w ∈W .
• Each manm such that σ (m) , σ−1(m) prefers σ (m) to σ−1(m) with probability xm .
• Each womanw such that σ (w) , σ−1(w) prefers σ (w) to σ−1(w) with probability yw .
• Each pair (m,w) such that σ (m) , w and σ (w) ,m is blocking with probability xmyw .
Hence the formula:
P[σ is stable] =
∫
· · ·
∫
︸    ︷︷    ︸
2N
dx · dy ·
∏
m,w
σ (m)=w
σ (w ),m
xm ·
∏
m,w
σ (m),w
σ (w )=m
yw ·
∏
m,w
σ (m),w
σ (w ),m
(1 − xmyw )
For the more general problem of stable roommates, Mertens [19] combined this formula with
an inclusion-exclusion principle to compute the probability that a random instance has a solution.
4 INPUT MODEL
In this section, we describe the preference distribution that will be our input model. Subsection 4.1
gives the most general definition, Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 detail interesting special cases.
4.1 Symmetric preference distributions
After observing that the output distributions of MPDA and WPDA are identical when the pref-
erence profile is generated from a bipartite graph (see Section 2), we used computer simulations
on more general classes of input distributions. We observed that MPDA and WPDA are ex-ante
equivalent with the input model illustrated in Figure 4 and defined in Definition 2.
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P =
w1 w2 w3
m1 2 1 3
m2 5 6 2
m3 3 4 1
The preference list of w1 ism2 ≻ m1 ≻ m3
with probability:
1/3
1/2 + 1/5 + 1/3
·
1/2
1/2 + 1/5
·
1/5
1/5
≈ 0.23
m1 is 3
rd
m2 is 3
rd
m3 is 3
rd
m1 is 2
nd
m2 is 2
nd
m2 is 1
st
1/2
1/5+1/3+1/2
1/5
1/5+1/3+1/2
1/3
1/5+1/3+1/2
1/2
1/5+1/2
1/5
1/5+1/2
1/5
1/5
Fig. 4. Symmetric anti-popularity preference distribution
The stochastic process used to generate preference lists is very similar (but not equivalent) to the
model studied in [9, 12, 16]. Agents build their preference lists by sampling without replacement
from a distribution (in [9, 12, 16] agents first sample their favourite partner, in this paper agents
first sample their least preferred partner).
Definition 2 (Symmetric anti-popularity preference distribution). Consider any function P : M×
W → R>0, where P(m,w) is the “popularity” thatm and w attribute to each other. Each manm
first builds an “anti-popularity” distribution over the women, where woman w has a probability
of 1/P(m,w) (renormalized such that the sum of probability is 1); then he builds his preference
list from the end, by sampling without replacement from this “anti-popularity” distribution: he
first samples his least preferred partner, then his second least, ..., then his favorite partner. Sym-
metrically, each womanw builds a preference list using her “anti-popularity” distribution over the
men.
We say that this preference distribution is symmetric because the “popularity” thatm gives to
w is the same as the “popularity” thatw gives tom. The “popularity” parameter P(m,w) relates to
how likely arem andw to like each other. In particular, a womanw will prefer manm1 to manm2
with probability P(m1,w)/(P(m1,w) + P(m2,w)).
Definition 2 has several equivalent formulations. Definition 4 will be used in the proof in Sec-
tion 5. Definition 3 is an intermediate formulation, useful to prove the equivalence of Definitions 2
and 4. For a direct proof of equivalence, see Lemma 4 of [7].
Definition 3 (Symmetric memoryless utility preference distribution). Utility preferences are de-
fined by a collection of values (Um,w ,Vm,w), where Um,w is the utility that man m gets if he is
matched withw , whereVm,w is the utility that womanw gets if she is matched withm, and where
each agent wants to maximize their utility. Consider only the cases where all Um,w and Vm,w are
independent random variables, such that the expected values are symmetric (that is E[U ] = E[V ]),
and such that each coefficient is memoryless (that is P[X > s + t | X > t] = P[X > s] for s, t > 0).
Lemma4.1.1. Symmetric anti-popularities and symmetric memoryless utilities induce the same class
of preference distributions.
Proof. Consider any symmetric anti-popularity preference distribution. For all man m and
womanw , define independent exponential randomvariablesUm,w andVm,w of parameter 1/P(m,w).
In the stochastic process using anti-popularities, someone’s last choice is independent with the be-
ginning of their preference list, which is analogous to the memorylessness property of exponential
random variables. Conversely, any memoryless continuous random variable in an exponential ran-
dom variable. For all manm and womanw , we define P(m,w) = E[Um,w ] = E[Vm,w]. 
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Definition 4 (Symmetric power preference distribution). Consider any function P : M ×W →
R>0, where P(m,w) is the “power” thatm andw attribute to each other. LetX andY be two random
matrices, uniformly sampled from [0, 1]M×W. Values of X and Y induce a preference profile:
∀m ∈ M,∀w1,w2 ∈ W, w1 ≻m w2 ⇔ X
P (m,w1)
m,w1 < X
P (m,w2)
m,w2
∀w ∈ W,∀m1,m2 ∈ M, m1 ≻w m2 ⇔ Y
P (m1,w )
m1,w < X
P (m2,w )
m2,w
Lemma 4.1.2. Symmetric powers and symmetric memoryless utilities induce the same class of pref-
erence distributions.
Proof. Consider a power distribution defined by a function P : M × W → R>0 and two
random matrices X and Y , uniformly sampled from [0, 1]M×W. For all manm and woman w , let
Um,w = −P(m,w)·lnXm,w andVm,w = −P(m,w)·lnYm,w . ThenUm,w andVm,w are independent ex-
ponential random variables, which define symmetric memoryless utilities. The two preference pro-
file distributions are identical. Conversely, any memoryless continuous distribution is an exponen-
tial random variable. For all manm and womanw , we define P(m,w) = E[Um,w ] = E[Vm,w]. 
4.2 Incomplete preference distribution
In this subsection, we prove that Definition 2 is strictly more general that Definition 1. In the sense
that Theorem 2 implies Theorem 1. The main technique is to approximate an incomplete uniform
preference distribution with a symmetric anti-popularity distribution, where the popularity of an
edge of the bipartite graph is 1 and the popularity of a non-edge approaches 0.
Proof (Theorem 2⇒ Theorem 1). Let (M ∪W, E) be any bipartite graph. For all ε > 0, we
define a random preference profile Prefε = (≻
ε
· ), sampled from a symmetric anti-popularity prefer-
ence distribution with a popularity function Pε = ε + (1−ε) ·1E, where 1E is the indicator function
of the set of edges E.
Let Prefε |E be the same preference profile, where every couple not in the set of edgesE is declared
as unacceptable. Observe that for every ε > 0, the distribution of the random preference profile
Prefε |E is exactly the incomplete uniform preference distribution induced by the graph (M∪W, E).
Now let us describe the typical behavior of the preference profile Prefε . We say that event OKε
holds if every edge of E precedes every non-edge of E. More formally, we have:
Event OKε holds ⇔ ∀(m,w) ∈ E, ∀w
′ ∈ W, (m,w ′) < E ⇒ w ≻εm w
′
∀m′ ∈ W, (m′,w) < E ⇒ m ≻εw m
′
Using an union bound, event OKε holds with probability at least 1 − εN
3.
We see MPDA and WPDA as functions, which take as input a preference profile and output
a matching (seen as a subset of M ×W). Using Subsection 3.1, we know that when OKε holds,
preference profiles Prefε and Prefε |E have the same stable matchings (when restricted to E).
Event OKε holds ⇒ MPDA(Prefε ) ∩ E = MPDA(Prefε |E )
WPDA(Prefε ) ∩ E =WPDA(Prefε |E )
Theorem 2 says that for every ε > 0 the random variables MPDA(Prefε ) and WPDA(Prefε ) have
the same distribution. This equality, as ε approaches 0, proves Theorem 1. 
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4.3 Vertical preference distribution
Symmetric anti-popularities are useful to model “cross sided” preferences. As an example, consider
the market of PhDs and post-doc positions. Imagine that Alice has a very good thesis in Computer
Science, because of her skills she will most likely apply for a post-doc in a very good computer
science department; symmetrically this university will most likely rank Alice first.
However, one might be afraid that symmetric anti-popularities do not encompass “one sided”
preferences: all the PhDs might prefer university X to university Y, and all the universities might
prefer Alice to Bob. The input distributions studied in [9, 12, 16] were able to model this kind of
examples. In this subsection we answer this concern, proving that symmetric anti-popularities are
strictly more general than vertical anti-popularities.
Definition5 (Vertical anti-popularity preference distribution). Consider two functions PM :M →
R>0 and PW : W → R>0, where PM (m) is the popularity that all the women give to man m,
and where PW(w) is the popularity that all the men give to woman w . Men first build an “anti-
popularity” distribution over the women, where woman w has a probability of 1/PW(w) (renor-
malized such that the sum of probability is 1); then each man builds his preference list from the
end, by sampling without replacement from this “anti-popularity” distribution: he first samples
his least preferred partner, then his second least, ..., then his favorite partner. Symmetrically, each
womanw builds a preference list using the “anti-popularity” distribution over the men.
Lemma 4.3.1. Vertical anti-popularities can be simulated with symmetric anti-popularities.
Proof. For all manm and woman w , define P(m,w) = PM (m) · PW(w). Because of the renor-
malization step, the symmetric anti-popularity preference distribution is identical to the vertical
anti-popularity preference distribution. 
5 MAIN THEOREM
In this section, we prove the main result of this paper. The proof of Theorem 2 is split in three steps,
organized in three subsections. First, we generalize to our input model the formula which gives
the probability that a permutation is stable. Second we prove that a permutation and its inverse
are equally likely to be stable. Third, we compute the output distributions of MPDA and WPDA
using the probability of stability of permutations.
Theorem 2. In a randommatching market where the preference profile is sampled from a symmetric
anti-popularity preference distribution, the output distributions of MPDA and WPDA are identical.
Proof. A fixed matching µ is outputted by WPDA if and only if it is stable and women-optimal.
In Lemma 5.3.1, we give a formula for the probability that µ is stable and women-optimal.
P[µ is stable and women-optimal] =
∑
σ permutation
σ |M=µ |M
(−1)C (σ ) · P[σ is stable]
Moreover, for every permutation σ we have:
• σ and σ−1 are equally likely to be stable (proved in Lemma 5.2.1).
• σ and σ−1 have the same number of cycles of length > 2 (that is C(σ ) = C(σ−1)).
• σ |M = µ |M if and only if σ
−1
|W
= µ |W
Thus, we haveP[µ is stable and women-optimal] = P[µ is stable and men-optimal]. Thematching
µ has the same probability of being the output of MPDA and WPDA, which concludes the proof.

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5.1 Probability of stability with a non-uniform distribution
In this subsection, we use the equivalence of Definitions 2 and 4 to prove Lemma 5.1.1.
Lemma 5.1.1. Let P : M ×W → R>0 define a symmetric anti-popularity preference distribution.
The probability that a fixed permutation σ :M ∪W →M ∪W is stable is
P[σ is stable] =
∫
· · ·
∫
︸    ︷︷    ︸
2N
dx · dy ·
∏
m,w
σ (m)=w
σ (w ),m
x
P (m,σ−1(m))
P (m,w )
m
∏
m,w
σ (m),w
σ (w )=m
y
P (σ−1 (w ),w )
P (m,w )
w
∏
m,w
σ (m),w
σ (w ),m
(
1 − x
P (m,σ−1(m))
P (m,w )
m y
P (σ−1 (w ),w )
P (m,w )
w
)
Proof. Using Lemmas 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, sampling the preference profile from a symmetric anti-
popularity preference distribution (with a “popularity” function P) is equivalent with sampling
the preference profile with symmetric power preference distribution (with a “power” function P).
Hence, let X and Y be two random matrices, uniformly sampled from [0, 1]M×W. Values of X and
Y induce a preference profile:
∀m ∈ M,∀w1,w2 ∈ W, w1 ≻m w2 ⇔ X
P (m,w1)
m,w1 < X
P (m,w2)
m,w2
∀w ∈ W,∀m1,m2 ∈ M, m1 ≻w m2 ⇔ Y
P (m1,w )
m1,w < X
P (m2,w )
m2,w
As in Subsection 3.3 for the uniform case, we condition on the values of x = [Xm,σ −1(m)]m∈M and
y = [Yσ −1(w ),w ]w ∈W . The permutation σ is stable if for all pair (m,w) we have:
• If σ (m) = w and σ (w) ,m, thenw ≻m σ
−1(m).
P[w ≻m σ
−1(m)] = P
[
X
P (m,w )
m,w < X
P (m,σ −1(m))
m,σ −1(m)
]
= x
P (m,σ−1(m))
P (m,w )
m
• If σ (m) , w and σ (w) =m, thenm ≻w σ
−1(w).
P[m ≻w σ
−1(w)] = P
[
Y
P (m,w )
m,w < Y
P (σ −1(w ),w )
σ −1(w ),w
]
= y
P (σ−1 (w ),w )
P (m,w )
w
• If σ (m) , w and σ (w) ,m, then σ−1(m) ≻m w or σ
−1(w) ≻w m.
P[σ−1(m) ≻m w or σ
−1(w) ≻w m] = 1 − P[w ≻m σ
−1(m) andm ≻w σ
−1(w)]
= 1 − P
[
X
P (m,w )
m,w < X
P (m,σ −1(m))
m,σ −1(m)
]
· P
[
Y
P (m,w )
m,w < Y
P (σ −1(w ),w )
σ −1(w ),w
]
= 1 − x
P (m,σ−1(m))
P (m,w )
m y
P (σ−1 (w ),w )
P (m,w )
w
Conditioning on x and y, each (m,w) property is independent, hence the formula. 
5.2 Integration by substitution
In this subsection, we prove that a permutation and its inverse are equally likely to be stable. The
intuition is the following. If we build σ with the example of Figure 3, we have a cycle of length 4:
σ (m2) = w2, σ (w2) = m3, σ (m3) = w3, σ (w3) = m2. The probability that each person prefer their
successor to their predecessor is:
P (m2, w3)
P (m2, w3) + P (m2, w2)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ (m2)≻m2σ
−1(m2)]
· P (m2, w2)
P (m2, w2) + P (m3, w2)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ (w2)≻w2σ
−1(w2)]
· P (m3, w2)
P (m3, w2) + P (m3, w3)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ (m3)≻m3σ
−1(m3)]
· P (m3, w3)
P (m3, w3) + P (m2, w3)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ (w3)≻w3σ
−1(w3)]
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However, in the inverse permutation σ−1 we reverse every edge of the cycle. Observe that the
probability that each person prefer their successor to their predecessor remains the same.
P (m2, w2)
P (m2, w3) + P (m2, w2)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ −1(m2)≻m2σ (m2)]
· P (m3, w2)
P (m2, w2) + P (m3, w2)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ −1(w2)≻w2σ (w2)]
· P (m3, w3)
P (m3, w2) + P (m3, w3)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ −1(m3)≻m3σ (m3)]
· P (m2, w3)
P (m3, w3) + P (m2, w3)︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
P[σ −1(w3)≻w3σ (w3)]
To incorporate the other conditions of stability, we use the formula from Lemma 5.1.1.
Lemma 5.2.1. Let P : M ×W → R>0 define a symmetric anti-popularity preference distribution.
A permutation σ : M ∪W →M ∪W and its inverse σ−1 are equally likely to be stable.
Proof. From Lemma 5.1.1 we have an integral formula for the probability that permutation σ
is stable. We are going to use an integration by substitution. For each person, we define a function
φ.
∀m ∈ M, φm :
{
[0, 1] → [0, 1]
x 7→ x
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,σ−1(m))
∀w ∈ W, φw :
{
[0, 1] → [0, 1]
y 7→ y
P (σ (w ),w )
P (σ−1 (w ),w )
Each φ is a differentiable function with integrable derivative, satisfying φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1.
When we make the substitution
∫ φ(1)
φ(0)
f (t)dt =
∫ 1
0
f (φ(t))φ ′(t)dt , all the terms cancel nicely.∏
m,w
σ (m),w
σ (w ),m
(
1 − φm(xm)
P (m,σ−1(m))
P (m,w ) φw (yw )
P (σ−1(w ),w )
P (m,w )
)
=
∏
m,w
σ −1(m),w
σ −1(w ),m
(
1 − x
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,w )
m y
P (σ (w ),w )
P (m,w )
w
)
∏
m
φ ′m(xm)
∏
m,w
σ (m)=w
σ (w ),m
φm(xm)
P (m,σ−1(m))
P (m,w ) =
∏
m
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,σ −1(m))
· x
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,σ−1(m))
−1
m
∏
m,w
σ (m)=w
σ (w ),m
xm
=
∏
m
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,σ −1(m))
∏
m,w
σ (m)=w
σ (w ),m
x
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,σ−1(m))
m
=
∏
m
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,σ −1(m))
∏
m,w
σ −1(m)=w
σ −1(w ),m
x
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,w )
m
Symmetrically, we have∏
w
φ ′w (yw )
∏
m,w
σ (m),w
σ (w )=m
φw (yw )
P (σ−1(w ),w )
P (m,w ) =
∏
w
P (σ (w ),w )
P (σ −1(w ),w )
∏
m,w
σ −1(m),w
σ −1(w )=m
y
P (σ (w ),w )
P (m,w )
w
Finally, the two products of ratios cancel each other:
∏
m
P (m,σ (m))
P (m,σ −1(m))
∏
w
P (σ (w ),w )
P (σ −1(w ),w )
= 1. 
5.3 Inclusion-exclusion principle
In this subsection, we compute the probability that a matching µ is the men/women-optimal stable
matching. To do so, we use an inclusion-exclusion principle on the set of rotations which could be
exposed and women/men-improving in µ .
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Lemma 5.3.1. Let P : M ×W → R>0 define a symmetric anti-popularity preference distribution.
The probability that a matching µ : M ∪W →M ∪W is stable and men/women-optimal is
P[µ is stable and women-optimal] =
∑
σ permutation
σ |M=µ |M
(−1)C (σ ) · P[σ is stable]
P[µ is stable and men-optimal] =
∑
σ permutation
σ |W=µ |W
(−1)C (σ ) · P[σ is stable]
where C(σ ) is the number of cycle of length > 2 in σ .
Proof. Themen andwomen cases being symmetric, we prove the formula giving the probability
that a matching is stable and women-optimal. Let R be the set of rotations r such that r (m) = µ(m)
for all manm ∈ r . Matching µ is outputted by WPDA when it is stable and women-optimal: no
rotation r ∈ R is exposed and women-improving in µ .
P[µ is stable and women-optimal] = P[µ is stable] − P[µ is stable and some r ∈ R is exposed]
Using an inclusion-exclusion principle to compute the probability of a disjunction, we obtain:
P[µ is stable and women-optimal] =
∑
R⊆R
(−1) |R | · P[µ is stable and every r ∈ R is exposed]
Recall that two different rotations can be exposed at the same time only if they are disjoint. Thus,
we can consider only sets R ⊆ R of disjoint rotations. Moreover, µ is stable and every rotation
from R is exposed if an only if the associated permutation σR is stable.
σR :

m 7→ µ(m) ifm ∈ M
w 7→ µ(w) if w ∈ W andw < r for all r ∈ R
w 7→ r (w) if w ∈ W andw ∈ r for some r ∈ R
IfC(σ ) is the number of cycles of length > 2 in σ , we have C(σR) = |R |, concluding the proof. 
6 FUTUREWORK
We proved that under certain input distributions, MPDA andWPDA have the same output distribu-
tion. This distribution can be computed by combining Lemmas 5.1.1 and 5.3.1. In the uniform case,
all the matching have the same probability in the output distributions. Simplifying our formula to
find 1/N ! would be an interesting result.
Procedures WPDA and MPDA are two deterministic algorithms which select one stable match-
ing. It would be interesting to characterize which algorithm also has the same output distribution.
Some candidate mechanisms are studied in [13]. In particular, we believe that our proof extends
to the mechanism of Employment by Lotto [3], and numerical simulations suggest it also applies
for Roth and Vande Vate’s incremental procedure [5, 18, 25].
The “ex-ante core-converge” property is a mathematical curiosity, and it does not imply any-
thing on the strategyproofness of the deferred acceptance algorithms. However, one economic
interpretation is the following. A decision maker who has prior knowledge on the input distribu-
tion of preferences (e.g. from historical data) might try to favor some outcomes (independently
of agents’ preferences). We proved that under certain input distributions, a decision maker who
has to chose between the MPDA and WPDA procedures cannot manipulate (before seeing agents’
preferences).
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